

Alternative Futures of a Challenged Democracy in

Mika Mannermaa, *Futures of Democracy*. Helsinki, Parliament of Finland, 2006, 113-127.

Abstract:

Is democracy breaking down, fundamentally being challenged? Is this breakdown leading to its deepening, broadening and transformation? The foundational challenges to democracy will be explored in this chapter. First, to the challenge of security, four scenarios are developed: the global empire-state; global one person-one vote; global institutional democracy; and regional democracy. Second, the challenges to the local are developed – both to the local councilor in the West and the local mullah in Islamic regions. Third, the inner dimensions of democracy are explored as an attempt to answer the question: is it possible to have public democracy if the many selves that constitute us are controlled by an authoritarian ego? Fourth, the challenge to traditional forms of leadership and organization are explored, particularly the possibility of a facilitative leader guiding a learning and healing organization.

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SELF-DEFINITION

Democracy is no longer a stable concept. Even the mythology around its invention is contested. Is democracy Greek in its origins or as the historian Sarkar argues, invented by the Licivvi dynasty from Bengal.¹ Even the Greek historical heritage is challenged with Martin Bernal arguing in *Black Athena* that the Greek heritage in fact has African roots.²

The instability of democracy and its futures means that we cannot forecast its future with precision. However, we can use the instabilities, the points where it is being contested, to develop its alternative futures.

This chapter will explore the futures of democracy focusing on how it is breaking down, and potentially transforming.

Democracy is central to how the West defines itself, and more and more, how all countries, and indeed, humans, define themselves. It is the one category that no one is willing to let go of.

During the 2003 Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq, what feared Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld was that democracy – the Enlightenment aspirations of the USA as the land of the good, the rational and the fair – may be challenged. Thus, it was crucial that the USA be seen as fair and democratic – certainly not as evil, as foundational racist or Orientalist. Thus, the problem of torture was constructed as an issue of managerialism. "A few bad apples," was the conclusion of the Administration, meaning the deep myth of the West as provider of the good, true and beautiful was safe.³ The problems were caused by private contractors incorrectly training security personnel and by the lack of procedural discipline as evidenced by the pervasiveness of digital cameras.

Democracy had to be above the fray.

However, the presence of digital cameras and what they signify cannot be taken lightly as they hyperdrive democracy into a new context: the global digital economy.

Digital cameras and the uploading of pictures in public spaces such as the web not only create new possibilities for transparency, they also create peer-to-peer governance possibilities. For example, Youtube.com and asiangroove.com are among many peer-to-peer websites where one can share private videos in global community spaces, develop one's directing abilities and create new communities of meaning. These are part of a new virtual democratic space where citizens learn tools, develop their capacity (video, audio, muckraking, spreading alternative news) and at heart challenge the vertical dimensions of democracy.

It is this vertical dimension that those critical of Abu Ghraib were quick to emphasize. Democracy was never for all – slaves, women in Greek history were not party to formal politics – and indeed this distinction can be seen as foundational to the construction of the Other. Democracy within the national polis but terror (for those) outside. Thus, Abu Ghraib is a symptom of the vertical nature of democracy – those outside are mistreated, seen as less, even subhuman, while those inside have the power to power.

But from the broader American perspective, it is not Empire against the third world - democracies tend not to attack other democracies - but the lack openness societies in the Third that is the root problem. The way to make the world safe is to turn every nation into a democracy.⁴ The subtext is that of parent helping children grow up, but when the child becomes teenager with weapons, then security becomes paramount.

This becomes the next challenge to democracy. The notion of security and nation.

In a recent essay, Philip Bobbit⁵ claimed that just as the 20th century began with World War I the shooting of Prince Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the 21st century has begun with the cruel events of September 11.⁶

While there have many recent challenges to the nation state – the evolution of human rights, environmental problems that can only be solved through global agencies and action, to mention a few – it is the rise of the virtual nation that represents perhaps the biggest challenge. Al-Qaeda is the best example threatening the world economy and specifically certain Western and Islamic nations. Microsoft, and other multinationals, too function as virtual nations, moving the icon of passport to the meme of the password. While one exists on the edges of globalization, the spaces in between, the other changes the entire game. Indeed, it is noteworthy that President of China, Hu Jintao visited Bill Gates first on his April 2006 trip to the USA. Reported Reuters, "China president at Gates house, not White House."⁷

Bobbit's solution – here focusing not on big capital but on unknown terror - is the development of a stronger state, within the bounds of today's nation-states. Only strong states can challenge virtual outlaws such as Al-Qaeda. And for those on the Left, only strong states can ensure that there is economic equity as large corporations distort local economies – the strong state remains the best answer to inequitable globalization.

But does Bobbit's solution go far enough? Are stronger states the answer to the new challenge? While certainly this is one future – nation-states becoming far more security conscious, using surveillance technologies to watch citizens, preemptive military and legal strikes on communities and individuals contemplating terrorist activities – another future points to not a return to democracy within the nation-state but to an evolutionary jump to global democracy. The models for this future vary but they are similar in the nation-state becomes far less important (in defining the policy agenda, in regulating the economy and society).

MODELS AND SCENARIOS OF THE FUTURES OF DEMOCRACY

1. A **global empire-state**, like we have never seen before. This is not just cultural imperialism but military, political and economic domination. Power would be usurped in the name of democracy. However, at this stage, this grand future is unlikely. States are unwilling to give up so much power – cultures are varied, and while the USA harbors ambitions of expansion, having indirect control of world institutions is far more to the liking of the USA. This is not because of the exorbitant costs in managing an empire, but also because a root American myth is that "we are good people" not empire builders.

Moreover, managing global democracy is deeply problematic. Which nations should be allowed to vote, for example? In Arnold Toynbee's macrohistory, he considers world states as examples of failure. They emerge when creative minorities are unable to meet civilizational challenges – in this case the challenge of Al-Qaeda. However, this is only the visible challenge. The deeper challenge is that of (1) systems of representation which no longer match the realities of a global planet and (2) worldviews that are exclusive (God has chosen us, we have the right to expand), obedient to tribal narratives. A global empire state only represses and suppresses these concerns. Worldviews and ways of knowing of others are pushed back, delegitimized. If you will, one god wins over other gods, instead of a conversation of gods, or systems that allow a sharing of power, or alternative methods of distribution. Along with the American variety, as possible is the Islamic variety, the Caliphate, as imagined by Bin Laden and others. This would entail a wise council of muslim elders; patriarchy; strict moral rules for all – a general focus on the virtuous life. The American variety would be robust financially with God as the underlying story but not practice. The Islamic variety would be strict morally with the main challenge financially viability and cultural innovation.

How would democracy be maintained in this empire? Some alternatives are possible here. First, a two party system but with close agreement among the two parties ie with security the overwhelming issue, dissent would be limited. Second would be a one or two party system but with surveillance technology – the 1984 future. Third would be a selection-election system, wherein, as often in Singapore, elite put up certain candidates, and then citizens elect. The procedures and processes of who is selected is not open to question.

2. As radical is **one-person – one vote**. Instead of bracketing democracy within the nation-state, democracy explodes globally with each human⁸ allowed to vote. The nation-state becomes an administrative unit, not a political or unit of allegiance. This future is troublesome to many. Those with larger populations – India and China – are likely to have more elected representatives to a world body. And demographic trends do not see OECD nations winning this struggle, indeed, argue some statisticians, population growth will overwhelmingly favor

developing nations⁹ – with the Caucasian population of the world moving downward to less than 10% by 2150.¹⁰ Indeed, ninety-eight % of everyone who will be born in the foreseeable future will not be Caucasian but Asian and African.¹¹




Figure 1
(http://www.prb.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PRB/Educators/Human_Population/Population_Growth/Population_Growth.htm)

When we look at youth bulges, they are in areas where there are already considerable historical fault lines – groups demanding recognition and rights. Certainly, giving global voting power to young, angry, unemployed Arab men and women may be a desirable future to enhance the possibility of global security. While this may lead to the Hamas scenario –where the "wrong" group wins power – the problem of governance and administration is likely to soften any extreme group – that is, eventually less bombs and more memos.

have a house of nations; a house of large organizations (corporations, institutions, professional associations); a house of social movements and religions; and a house of individuals. The houses would be interlocking, ensuring that no one system dominates, as with the current checks and balances in the American system of governance. This approach, suggested by Johan Galtung¹³, would be an intermediate step to that of full one-person, one-vote and the current system of voting within the nation-state.¹⁴ The goal in this future would be to ensure multiple dimensions of representation so as to avoid a world state, and instead move toward more flexible global governance. While one may or may not like this particular model (citizen juries, a court of future generations, a reformed United Nations, are other approaches)– the goal would be to enhance global governance

4. **Regional democracy.** Mid way in these scenarios is that of regional democracy. While we can imagine someone from Europe playing a role in EU elections, it would appear strange for that person to be able to vote in East Asia. Through a regional approach (North America; South America; Europe; South Asia; East Asia; England, Australia, New Zealand; Pacific Islands, for example), some type of global democracy could emerge. The leading defining image for this future is the European Union. Indeed, even Asian Ministers have called for an Asian Currency¹⁵ – this would have been simply impossible, no, unthinkable a decade ago. Cultural distinction may remain (though blur over time) but administrative democracy would emerge.

Where would the resistance be to changes in the current model of democracy (as defined as democracy within nations, but no clear rules outside except the nation, except through the UN system)? Resistance to the current system would come from those who directly benefit from the nation-state capitalist system but as well as by those who would be afraid of the risk of a new system. Even if one could argue that globalization has unleashed the genie of systems cultural change and there is no going back to the nation-state system, ensuring that one's own cultural proclivities continue would be paramount. In Australia, this is the fear of "yellow peril" or asian invasion. Anglo values held dear can not be challenged. The response to the possibility of globalized democracy would not be experimentation but walled futures. Thus Fortress Europe, Fortress Australia, Fortress America are likely scenarios. As with all fortresses efforts to jump over the walls would continue (from refugees, from anti-systemic groups, from al-Qaeda inc, and from multinational corporations). For those in poorer nations, local leaders again would not be excited about a prospect of losing power to larger systems and institutions, especially as their funding and legitimacy comes from patronage to local clans and villages.

LOCAL FUTURES

The local here becomes the key. For example, the local shire or city councilor in Australia, and for that matter, many OECD nations, face similar governance issues. The councilor is in search for a new identity. Their traditional power broking role made sense

in an 18th century technological environment. James Dator¹⁶ has argued this case that advances in technology make today's horse and buggy structured democracy ridiculous. With rapid communication (e-swarmling, sms protests, for example) and globalization - for example, local shires in Australia travel regularly to China to position themselves for future energy, administrative contracts¹⁷ – the local councilor suddenly is at a disadvantage if he can only speak the local language and only understand local culture. Multiple languages and an understanding of multiple cultures is central to a future sustainable role. However, they are often elected on the immediate, the local, on problem solving. It is not just technological revolutions (the net, the mobile phone, and even the cassette recorder and fax¹⁸) and globalization that challenge the local councilor but attempts by local shires to manage their futures. This is a two part process. The first stage has been community consultation. This has been done to ensure that there is buy-in to development projects, that citizens are engaged, that deeper democracy results. The second is futures visioning. This is about mapping the past, analyzing the present, developing scenarios around the city's futures, and articulating a preferred future.¹⁹ This process empowers citizens and the professional bureaucracy. Councilors lose their privileged position in this world. Taking away local boundaries is likely to increase their tenuous claim to power and authority. In this sense, the local council is similar to the local mullah as their future options are being curtailed.

What are their ("mullahs") choices?

First, it is to join community consultation and citizen visioning, to become a guardian of the future and help citizens create desired futures – to help new forms of democracy emerge.

The second is to avoid this process and focus on very local concerns – neighborhood conflicts (though neighborhood mediation challenges this as well) and local zoning issues.

The third is to lament for the good old days and create a politics of the past resisting new technologies (e-governance), globalization (via localization, most often via a politics of culture, who got "here" first) and social innovation (attempts to create different futures and deep democracy). However, with even more advanced AI systems coming on-line and an increased search for niche futures in a globalized worlds, it is likely their hold on the politics of the future will be tenuous at best.

As mentioned earlier, city councilors of the OECD nations are the mullahs of the Islamic world are the party technocrats of the former Communist world – it is this fear of the loss of place that leads the Mullah to create a politics of rightist Islam. He can see that no future exists for him, thus a call for imagined past glory. A politics of interpretation and ambiguity again take power away from him, and thus a call to the past. Finally, with the interpretive dimension of the Quran easier for the less educated to access via AI systems (classifying in terms of what one must follow, what is a mere opinion, what is contested, who contests, ie a full information interpretive system), their role will certainly diminish even further.

They – the "mullahs" - have choices as well.

First is to help create a new civilization, the evolutionary jump forward where there is far more inclusion, planetary problems are dealt with, the long term future is included in today's decisions – that is a handmaiden to the future. However, this requires a softening, ie birthing is the metaphor – a feminine approach to politics. It requires working **with** other muslim groups to mediate problems, to search for solutions that include other groups, to find transcend solutions²⁰ to deep conflicts.

A second solution is to radicalize, to hold power by demonizing the other – calling other muslim groups less muslim (as in the shia versus sunni versus ahmedi)²¹ and calling other religious groups idol worshippers (as in "Hindus"²², Buddhists) and infidels (Jews and Christians).

A third is to hold power by again focusing on very local issues, avoiding the grander narratives, using economic and social patronage to ensure that children from the local village gain literacy, for example.

Ibn Khaldun, the 14th century philosopher, wrote that to retain power, *asabiya*, or the sinews that bind, unity is required. The cheapest unity is gained through the creation of enemies, real or imagined. The deepest unity is what the planet calls on us today for - a unity that deals with our very real strategic problems. On the grand challenges facing us – water, energy, climate, safety, dignity, to mention a few.

Currently, both in the OECD and in Islamic nations it is those who focus on the non-negotiable past that hold sway, on the cheap unity. It is the Fortress that is the image of the future. Other imaginations of governance do not figure in. This is largely as moderates are silenced.²³ This is also because the Right not only challenges the present but offers an easily understood image of the future. As well, by repeating the mantras of territory and security, the memes of tribalism remain current. Breaking these memes²⁴ will not be easy.

And yet when we ask what future we wish for, another politics emerges. In one workshop in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, when 150 Muslim leaders were asked their preferred futures, they responded in ways that would make a western Green happy. Gender partnership, economic alternatives to capitalism, self-reliant electronically linked communities, ecological sustainability and a global governance system were their key issues.²⁵ Thus part of the solution is by framing politics as less of who was here first (the politics of the past) to where do we want to be (the politics of the futures) and then negotiating conflicts between futures through alternative futures and conflict resolution methods, finding optimal solutions, not merely compromise²⁶

MYTHIC CONTEXT

The broader contest for this are world futures themselves.

In the Western mythos, two archetypes are central to understanding the future.

One is the land of Cockagne: fruit and leisure for all. It is a pastoral vision, pre-modern, listening and sharing are central – humans live with nature. This is expressed currently in the Return to the past scenario when the world was simpler, less overwhelming. Wise leaders made decisions for all. One was consulted but elders decide. Communication and relationship solve problems.

The other is the Land of Arcadia, more complex, living off nature, ever improving, continuous growth. Progress and technology are central. These two images wrestle with each other. The leader is who can achieve solutions, meet basic needs, and meet changing desires. Democracy fits well into this mythology, as different individuals are needed as desires and needs change.

Overtime, this myth has become modernity, or realism, indeed, it is the non-myth, the truth before our eyes, the reality by which all other histories and futures are judged. It is real power – economic and political - that defines the present and future.

And strangely, it is in the language of realism that the utopian seeds of global government are forming. To stop the outlaws (Al-Qaeda et al, the hyper movement of capital, global climate problems), extra territoriality is required. To deal with the real problems, more than a list of policies is needed. Other worldviews must be engaged with.

But there are two other myths as central as Cockagne and Arcadia.

The third myth is that of the apocalypse, the end of the world. Humankind has sinned, fallen away from the true path, and must now suffer. Recent comments on New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina by Christian extremists in the USA illustrate this.²⁷ Again, democracy is a luxury in this future – it is not so much the wise leader or technocratic leadership that is required but the strong leader.

Finally, there is the myth of transformation in each culture – where something new emerges. Spearheading this possibility are the technological changes (genetic, digital, nano, to begin with)²⁸ and the cultural-spiritual changes (the mind-body and brain health revolution, the cultural creatives as argued by Ray and Anderson)²⁹. A governance framework for this future has yet to be worked out – will it governance run by AI systems guided by wise elders, or full on line, real time, global democracy – endless e-swarming. A planet in constant dialogue? And will the technological and spiritual meet to create the imagination of Gaia Tech³⁰ or will they bifurcate creating two very different trajectories.

However, if we are to move toward a more transformed future, we cannot do so without enhancing inner democracy as well as the nature of contemporary leaders and the organizations they stand with.

INNER DEMOCRACY

As we hint above with the notion of archetypes, democracy should be seen not only as an external process and structure but an inner process as well.

That is, merely seeing the futures of democracy as an external construct avoids the notion how we organize our mind, our inner spaces. Do we have a voting process that gives

voice to our multiple selves (as developed by Hal and Sidra Stone³¹) or do we have an authoritarian ego, where alternative voices are not listened to, not included? How do we deal with those aspects of ourselves that do not vote (our inner "children", or those outside our internal "nation-state") – do we negotiate? Do we follow community consultation processes in our mind? Do we have a one party system? Is there a system of checks and balances when we make important decisions?

More often than not, as we are not aware of our multiple selves, we project them outwards, as the Stone's in their letter to Bush suggest³²:

Our deepest concern however is not the Saddam Hussein that lives in the world. It is the Saddam Hussein that lives in the hidden recesses of your own heart, of our own heart, in everyone's heart. If we don't ultimately recognize that this kind of energy lives in each of us, we keep projecting it on the outer Husseins and this makes it impossible to deal with the darkness in the world in any way other than war.

There are number of crucial points here. First, there may be a correlation between external and inner democracy. Can one be a democrat outside but run one's self/selves as a totalitarian system? The hypothesis would be that this would fail, that selves disenfranchised from participation would find pathological ways to strike back (serious illness, anxiety or panic attacks, or depression). Indeed, one cause of the dramatic rise of depression³³ may partly be because there is a lack of inner democracy in the self – selves are not in dialogue and communication with each other.

A related hypothesis is that if we wish to create a more democratic globe, we must begin with ourselves. This is more than a call to be a better person, to be fairer, but to create a map of our own inner selves, asking how are decisions made.³⁴ There are likely times when a quick decision is needed (do we return to our instinctual self, which perhaps is not democratic), and there are times when deep sensitivity to the external environment is needed (and thus the desperately needed perceptions of our multiple selves – our child self, aspects of the brain related to foresight, our self as other, disowned selves).

Taking this a step further, Hal and Sidra Stone argue that personality problems emerge when we disown various selves. This would imply that we have a democratic self that listens the various viewpoints of our selves (the child, the hero, the father, the lover, the mother, the nun) and we have authoritarian selves that assert that we **should** behave in certain ways. If we disown any particular self, we become impoverished, that is, even the authoritarian self may have some use – in facing difficult times, in knowing when to act. The deeper problem emerges when, the subpersonalities, do not cooperate, or are even at war with each other – the worse case scenario. This can lead to collapse of the system, a breakdown.

One conclusion would be that those calling for more democracy in the world may be projecting outwards, having not owned democracy in their country or democracy within themselves.

Critical International relations theory via the work of RBJ Walker challenges the notion of democracy within and anarchy outside, ie why is it that we accept democracy only within the nation-state? The Stone's approach applied to politics goes a step further and asks why is it that we have democracy in the external world and often authoritarian selves

in our inner world? If we wish to create alternative models of governance including new futures for democracy we as well need to articulate new futures for our inner life –map and transform the politics of our selves.

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONS

This essay has explored scenarios of the futures of democracy, focused on impediments of the global reform at the local level, linked scenarios with deep archetypes, particularly from the Western experience, and hypothesized that as important as democracy in the outside world is democracy in the inner world. I now take a mid-range approach and focus on the organization. Just as important as global reform, local reform, and inner reform is organizational reform. Merely changing those dimensions is oblivious to the reality that humans work in organizations and use organizations as vehicles to express their futures.

LEADERSHP AND THE NATURE OF THE ORGANIZATION




Figure 3

As with the argument of outside/inside; global/local and external/internal, can a non-democratic organization create a democratic future? In hundreds of workshops on scenarios and visioning, two variables continue to emerge when discussing the futures of organization.³⁵ The first variable is the nature of leadership. Will leadership continue to be command and control (authoritarian – you will be democratic!), focused on compliance and rules, and generally steeped in the discourse of patriarchy (security and sovereignty) or will leadership be organic, transformational, softer, more feminine, if you will, community consultation, listening to others?

The second critical variable, uncertainty, is the nature of the organization. There appear to be two extremes. The first is the classical industrial organization. In this, standardization is crucial – one works a certain hours a day, days a week, weeks a year, years in a lifetime. There is a clear chain of command. Rules must be followed. The organization is successful because it responds in the same way to outside and inside stimulus, meaning it is predictable. Certainly this may make sense in a stable world, where gender, technology, external climate, and notions of governance are shared. However, what happens in a disturbed world of rampant future-shock where gender, culture and time and continuously contested.

The other extreme is the learning and healing organization. In this type of organization, democracy is taken seriously, not just in terms of voting, but in terms of the broader and deeper ways I have situated it. There are two parts to this. First it is a learning organization, learning from its members, from the outside world. If 9-5 time is challenged, if the industrial paradigm is no longer appropriate, it adapts. If the local paradigm is no longer appropriate, it seeks to move outwards, becoming global. Returning to Toynbee's macrohistory, the leadership responds to organizational challenges in creative ways. The second part of this is the healing organization³⁶ – this is more concerned with the emotional-metaphorical dimension to work. Learning privileges the intellect and strategy while healing the heart and body. In this dimension, passive aggression, apathy, resignation are all named and transformed. Issues with colleagues, with the leadership, with the larger purpose of the organization are not seen as external issues but as pivotal. As well, the inner dimension of the organization is explored- not just its strategic focus but its inner focus. What is its story? Its defining metaphor? If democracy, then are all included?

Putting these two variables together, four futures for leadership and the organization emerge.

The left-upper quadrant [1] is essentially the traditional organization – strong male leadership with an industrial structure. Certainly this model historically helped create democratic institutions but can it do so in the future? With revolutions in technology (peer to peer), globalization, science and technology (genomics, nano and brain-mind) revolutions and changing cohorts (baby boomers defining organizations), is this model

sustainable? Perhaps not in Western countries, however, East Asian nations appear to be at ease with this. The Confucian overlay (strong vertical relations, respect of authority) allows traditional modes of leadership – the wise male leader – to flourish. Singapore is a case in point. There is democracy of sorts but certainly not deep democracy (multiparty system, dissent in the media). However, Singapore is not at the Left-upper quadrant but at the right-top [2]. This is because they have understood the emergent global-digital-cultural challenge. To prosper in a global knowledge economy, what is required is creativity, the difference that makes the difference. Copying the US does not lead to the required rewards. While liberal political scientists assume that as wealth increases, the federalist American system will dominate, this is far from clear. Their can and most likely will be different sorts of modern governance systems. At the inner level, the assumption in Singapore is that "Father knows best" and given that these are turbulent and disturbed times (i.e. where there is little consensus, where collectivities are far from agreement), having stable and wise government, even if not ideally democratic, may be the best choice. Singapore is willing to innovate. To do so it has begun to institutionalize creative thinking (not yet critical literacies though). However, it hopes to march into the future with a different drum beat.³⁷

The left bottom corner [3] is the current tension. Leaders, especially the cultural creatives, desire to enhance the capacity of organization. They want to empower individuals. However, even as they attempt to facilitate a new future, the structures of industrial society remain – time, space, labour – are standardized, making flexibility and creativity near impossible. Thus the tension and the apathy for creating more democratic futures (inner, outer, deeper and broader). The structure does not permit – the system is rigid, even as leaders envision a different future. If an employee becomes inspired, their capacity enhanced and paradigm changed, they experience anxiety. They are changed but the system is not, nor is the system financially and emotionally supportive. The reality of the present is past based while the employee is caught in-between changing images of the future. Either they successfully change the organization or they leave it, or they take a third approach – passive resistance, passive aggression and the full range of emotional sabotage.

Those inspired by a new future hope to create the right bottom quadrant [4] – the fourth alternative – a new leadership with a new type of organization. The leaders facilitate a learning and healing organization, and they lead organically by example. Is this possible?

The hypothesis is that if we wish for more democratic futures then we need to change the top-down model of leadership and the industrial model of organizing. This does not mean they must disappear, rather following the Stones notion of integrated selves, they need to be owned, and used when appropriate – when there are repetitious tasks, when there is consensus on direction, structure, process, content, for example. As well, in times of urgent crisis, then the hero archetype is far more important than community consultation and visioning. However, after the crisis, deep democracy is once again needed. The transition from the leadership required during urgency to the leadership required in

normal times is the great challenge. The hero tends to become the tyrant, having stayed on too long. He does not have the capacity to choose which self is most appropriate, as for example, the elitist Asian leader who stays in power long after the crisis, or his term, has ended.

CONCLUSION

It is often said that the crisis of democracy must be solved by more democracy. The argument I have made in this chapter is that yes this is the case, but it is more than that. Deeper democracy first means challenging the inside-outside division of the nation-state vis a vis international relations and governance, and thereby moving ideally to a world governance structure (and far less ideally to the empire model). Second, it means working with local representatives (councilors and mullahs, who have the most to lose) to help them find a purpose in the newly emerging governance system and culture. Third, the futures of democracy relate to archetypal futures – whether eating up nature (Continued growth), living with nature (Back to the past), collapsing or somehow transforming. Transformation appears to be the hoped for future, certainly in this analysis, given the cascading of world crisis – the planetary challenge. This transformation, however, is not just external but internal, the multiple selves that we are. If we are to create deeper democratic futures, then we need to map our multiple selves, own or disowned selves, and analyze how we project outwards (as persons and as civilizations). Finally, to create different democratic futures, new types of leadership and organizations are required – ones that are organic facilitative and that are learning and healing oriented. These are not just goals for a deeper democracy but as with self-reliance- the path and the goal must be one.

Given the overwhelming change required of us, perhaps we should remain committed to the current system. Why travel outside and within?

But what will our legacy to the future be if we do not change? Perhaps we should ask future generations to choose which history they wish.

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¹ For more on this claim, see Sohail Inayatullah, *Understanding Sarkar*, Leiden, Brill, 2002. Also, see www.prout.org and P.R.Sarkar, *Prout in a Nutshell*. Translated by Acharaya Vijayananda Avadhuta. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications, 1988. And: Sohail Inayatullah, *Situating Sarkar*, Maleny, Gurukul, 1999.

² <http://www.theafrican.com/Magazine/Athena/intro.htm> for an excellent debate on the subject. Accessed 12th April 2006.

³ <http://www.talkradionews.com/blogs/uncommonsense/2005/11/few-bad-apples.html> for more on this. Accessed 12 April 2006.

⁴ Edward D. Mansfield And Jack Snyder *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. MIT Press, 2005, is a challenge to the democracy war thesis.

⁵ Philip Bobbitt, "Great Ready for the Next Long War," *Time* (9 September 2002), 74-75.

⁶ Certainly 1990 makes more sense – the fall of communism and the rise of the Digital era.

⁷ http://news.com.com/China+president+at+Gates+house,+not+White+House/2100-1001_3-6061616.html. Accessed 11 May 2006.

⁸ The issue of political rights for non-humans is crucial but not directly dealt with in this paper – Should trees have standing and will robots have legal rights are long term emerging issues which too will change the nature of "Greek" democracy.

⁹ India in particular will have the demographic bonus, enough young people to provide labour but not too many old people where the social security bill is overwhelming. This is known as the population dividend. <http://www.flonnet.com/fl2301/stories/20060127004010500.htm>

¹⁰ <http://www.lifeissues.org/international/v9n5.html>. United Nations figure - in the medium project scenario have Africa at 2.8 billion, Asia at 5.1 billion, Latin America at 916 million, North America at 414 million and Europe at 590 million. World population would be around 11 billion. 90-95% would be "non-white" in these figures. However, this is crucial, population trends are not destiny, the UN offers a range of projections and scenarios, and categories of "white", "nonwhite" are socially constructed.

http://iggi.unesco.or.kr/web/iggi_docs/05/952655858.pdf. Also see:

http://www.prb.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PRB/Educators/Human_Population/Population_Growth/Population_Growth.htm

¹¹ Sally Neal, Social Trends: Implications and Opportunities. Queensland Government, Department of Primary Industries. www.dpi.qld.gov.au/business/Welcome.html.

¹² For more on this, see: <http://www.eolss.net/E1-24-toc.aspx>. "Global Transformations and Futures: Knowledge, Economy and Society," in Sohail Inayatullah, theme editor, *Global Transformations and World Futures*, *UNESCO Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems* (Oxford, EOLSS Publishers, 2002). Also in *EOLSS Papers*, World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002.

¹³ Johan Galtung, "Global Governance For, And By, Global Democracy," (Prepared for The Commission on Global Governance, Geneva, Switzerland, 1994). Also, see Frank Barnaby, *The Gaia Peace Atlas*. London, Pan Books, 1988. See in particular future governance, 239.

¹⁴ Almost complete voting in some countries (for adults but not for children); one party states, where voting is allowed but choice is limited; and in some barely any voting at all.

¹⁵ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_Currency_Unit. The Asian Development Bank is spearheading discussions on this.

¹⁶ <http://www.futures.hawaii.edu/> for articles by James Dator on this and many other topics.

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- ¹⁷ For example, Kathy Sundstrom, "Mayor defends links to China," Sunshine Coast Daily, (10 April 2006), front page.
- ¹⁸ Both of which played an important role in Iranian revolution of the early 1980s.
- ¹⁹ See the wonderful work of Steven Ames, see, <http://www.asu.edu/caed/proceedings97/ames.html>
- ²⁰ www.transcend.org for a methods on how to do this.
- ²¹ For ways out of these conflicts, see the work of Zia Sardar. Sohail Inayatullah and Gail Boxwell, eds. *Islam, postmodernism and other futures: A Ziauddin Sardar Reader*. London, Pluto, 2003.
- ²² Hindu is, of course, a muslim concept. There is no Hinduism per se, but a variety of spiritual and religious traditions in India – the tantric and vedic being the two main traditions.
- ²³ With violence, generally.
- ²⁴ <http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg/cpace/infotech/cook/memedef.html>. See Richard Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. The Oxford English Dictionary defines meme as: An element of a culture that may be considered to be passed on by non-genetic means, esp. imitation"Also, see Susan Blackmore, "Imitation and the definition of a meme", *Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission*, 1998, 2.
- ²⁵ Sohail Inayatullah, "Leaders envision the future of the Islamic Ummah," *World Futures Studies Federation Bulletin* (July 1996), Coverpage. This was many years ago – 1996 - and it is not clear how respondents would answer today. However, the key point is – asking questions about the future yields different results than about the past.
- ²⁶ www.transcend.org explores the transcend method wherein out of the box win-win solutions are developed, not compromises or the victory of one over the other.
- ²⁷ Alan Dawson, "Disasters bring nuts to full bloom," Bangkok Post, Monday 05 September 2005
- ²⁸ See the work of Ray Kurzweil – www.kurzweilai.net
- ²⁹ www.culturalcreatives.org. This group is focused on spiritual change, environmentalism, future generations thinking, global governance, and gender partnership.
- ³⁰ Linking robots and their futures with angels and their healing presence.
- ³¹ See for the full letter by Hal and Sidra Stone to George Bush, see <http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/lookwithin.html>. Accessed 12 April 2006.
- ³² *ibid*.
- ³³ see the forecasts by the WHO. http://www.who.int/topics/global_burden_of_disease/en/. Also see: http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0042-96862005000100018&lng=e&nrm=iso&tlng=e. World Health Organisation (2003). The global burden of disease. WHO, 2004. World Health Organization. Mental Health. http://www.who.int/mental_health/management/depression/definition/en/. Accessed 10/08/04
- ³⁴ This is more complex than the useful Jungian light/shadow distinction
- ³⁵ For more on this, see Sohail Inayatullah, *Questioning the Future*. Tamsui, Tamkang University, 2005.
- ³⁷ While Singapore would certainly be male in this regard – you will innovate, one can imagine a global nanny state – Singapore plus Scandinavia plus surveillance technology– the state "benevolently" taking care of all.