Governance, Representation and Types of Power:
From Montesquieu to P.R. Sarkar

Introduction

Eschewing traditional perspectives on governance – often characterized by instructions to the king on how to properly rule – this essay focuses on classical, modern and postmodern theories of structure and representation. Borrowing from Montesquieu and Sarkar we develop an alternative but modern structural design of governance. To arrive at this political design we traverse a variety of epistemological positions ranging from classical Chinese and Islamic political theories that focus on representing the transcendental in worldly space to postmodern positions that make representation itself problematic.

Montesquieu's lasting contribution to political theory is the division of governmental power into three arenas: executive, judicial and legislative, a clever combination of the classic typology of rule of the one, the few and the many. This division combined the ancient categories of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, the idea of a mixed constitution. Within the framework, Montesquieu developed the theory of checks and balances – and the doctrine of the separation of different functions of government – both of which later found their form in the Federalist theory of the American constitution. Prior to that these three types of power were vested in the person of the King. The king made and interpreted the laws, executed policy and resolved disputes.

The reduction of the power of the king was gradual. In Western history, the Magna Carta decentralized some of this royal power allowing its sharing to other aristocrats, that is, from the ‘King as despot’ to the ‘King in Council.’ In despotism there were no ‘intermediate, subordinate and dependent’ powers, while in monarchy (the king in council) there were. With Montesquieu, the king became ‘King in Parliament.’ His power was reduced and a republic was defined.

In Eastern history, much earlier, it was the Licchivis of Vaeshali in India over 2500 years ago that developed a written constitution and abolished the monarchy. The representatives of the people were known as Licchavis and they formed an executive body known as Mahalicchavis through elections. This beginning of democracy has long been forgotten with democracy having been appropriated by the West. This claim by Sarkar, like Martin Bernal’s rethinking of the roots of Greek thought, shifts democracy and its Eurocentrism to a more diverse historical origin. But while these were important developments in previous millennia, the question remains what are appropriate forms of governance for the next.

The problem of representation

Among others, James Dator has argued that representative democracy is no longer a useful design as social and technological conditions are far removed from its (in the West) 17th and
18th century beginnings. Since culture was more homogenous then and travelling far distances to a central place was also more difficult, thus it was sensible to have a legislature that represented or mirrored the actions of its constituents. However with many nations having become multicultural modern societies, representation in the sense of reflecting the will of the people has become increasingly problematic. There is even a move in the US to make courts more sensitive to the cultural traditions of new immigrant groups so that legal codes more accurately represent their own historical cultural codes instead of only representing the cultural code of the dominant Anglo-Saxon group. The loosening of national identity (the breakdown of modernity, travel, electronic technologies, new forms of cultural and spiritual consciousness) further complicates the simplistic notion of representation in the sense of accurately reflecting the will of the people for there is no longer ‘one people’ – each one of us is many people. Ethnonationalism, of course, is an attempt to eradicate the many inside of us for a coherent historical one thus making representation once again transparent.

Insofar as electronic technologies have reduced physical distances, Dator argues for direct electronic democracy: direct voting on issues not on individuals. This is the reemergence of classic townhall or village participatory democracy where all those in the area spoke and expressed themselves. It is an attempt to rethink the classic category of the rule of the many by reminding us that embedded in the many are untold individuated ones.

Rejecting the Newtonian model of a linear, clockwork (checks and balances) model of reality and borrowing from the indeterminacy principles of quantum physics, this view argues that governance and laws should be fluid, rapidly changing and not fixed on any particular structure. Among the concrete proposals that emerge from this view is that legislators should be selected by random sampling and there should be direct voting on policy issues. Also, judicial decision making should be based on outcomes and the absolute rights of individuals (instead of the more fixed community sense of identity). In addition, courts need to decide cases based on a multiplicity of epistemological models of the real. While they should remain the final arbiters they need to show cultural sensitivity.

A central aspect of this political design is the need for voter education on policy issues. There needs to be a way to present information in a disinterested way. Ted Becker in his experiments called ‘Televote’ presents viewers with a range of policy choices. Once pre-educated on the alternative policies in front of them, they can then choose their preferred futures. But is disinterest possible? Is it possible to present neutral information, or is power everywhere, as poststructural writers argue? Can one speak from a place that is outside of culture and power, to somehow represent a fixed truth, a coherent view of culture and nation? Disinterest as reality is given to us through various forms, namely, language, culture, and historical structure, disinterest appears impossibly difficult. The real is mediated to us through various structures; the political – from this epistemological perspective – never loses sight of us and we the political, even as we make knowledge claims for objectivity.

For Montesquieu these postmodern issues were not a problem. Staying within the Platonic/Aristotelian discourse of the various types of political power, he suggested checks and balance, the combining of political types to neutralize the centralization of power. Dator, conversely, suggests that structures and types of power are in themselves unrepresentative epistemological intrusions; rather, the unit of political participation should be the individual, thus, direct electronic democracy with citizens themselves educating each other through various forms of decentralized electronic computer communications systems. Individuals should thus represent themselves and their political views. There is no need to resort to a
legislator. Not necessarily because they are corrupt (indeed that might be a more accurate representation of society) but because legislative power is not truly participatory. Periods of crises or ‘national emergency’ can be handled by temporary structures of hierarchy – through one person rule or by an efficient and responsive bureaucracy – to be ‘sunsetted’ after the crises.

Still, the problem of representation does not go away. Even in electronic democracy, the policy issues are still shaped by the ‘information presenters’ and action on legislative choices must still be interpreted and executed by other branches or individuals, all who claim to represent individuals and society. Moreover, individualized democracy makes an epistemological representation privileging the individual at the expense of structure, class or gender. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, for example, has argued that ‘collective democracy’ is more appropriate especially for developing nations. Individuals gain through the community. Individual needs are sacrificed for collective goals, for the future. As the community economically rises up then each individual gains. Thus one man, one vote merely leads to more discord as representatives push for their own sectoral interests not for the larger people. In contrast, in the Islamic view, the individual cannot be divorced from the community, the ummah. In classical Islamic political theory, the community liberates the individual allowing him to express his potential.

For Lee Kuan Yew and in the Islamic view, the role of leadership is central. The leader represents the aspirations of the people, providing an example for appropriate individual behavior. In the Chinese the leader is the wise father and in the Islamic case, the leader is the saint following perfectly the laws set by the Prophet – the original lawmaker. The leader then represents the collective good not necessarily the good of the individual (but he does represent the higher or wiser nature of the individual).

Representation then is not only a modern problem, it is a historical problem. According to political theorist Peter Manicas:

There is a sense in which all regimes are ‘representative’ – they claim to act for and usually to act in the interests of the people which they ‘rule.’ In saying that the idea of representative government is a modern invention, this is not, accordingly, the sense intended. More interesting and pertinent is the idea that regimes are the agent of or stand for those they rule. This idea is completely foreign to ancient political thought. Greek oligarchies were rule by the few and democracies were rule by the demos. In neither instance could it, or was it said that ‘rulers’ were the agents of or acted for anything or anybody. Indeed, the very shift in language, from ‘ruler’ to ‘governor’ and ‘government’ betrays the shift to which I am pointing.

**Power as economics**

Alternatively, Marxist Serbian thinker Mihailo Markovic, avoiding these epistemological adventures and staying within classical modern socialist thought, argues that since we define ourselves primarily as producers and it is economic exchange relations that moves history and give us culture and ideas, we need to develop a structural system of representation (in the sense of standing for) based on types of economic units. There should a House or a body of government that represents cooperatives, another to represent individual producers and then perhaps another one to represent the consumers. Representation should be based on actual forms of economic power to be of any use in allowing and creating political expression. In
various forms this has been the project of the communist movement where history, progress and the people are represented by the Party. The task is not so much to design systems that represent the individual or indeed the collective but to represent abstract ideals such as justice and equity – to find ways to counter the power of the wealthy.

But is the economic the only source of political power? That is, if governance and representation must deal with power and must find ways to tame power, to allow the use of power as enabler and creator of programs and plans but not the abuser of the polity, then perhaps we need to think of alternative notions of power.

Four types of power (and a fifth)

P.R. Sarkar here is important. Writing from an alternative cultural and historical perspective, Sarkar attempts to develop a political theory that has both structure (historical patterns that frame the real) and agency (the role of individuals and leadership) and superagency (the role of divine intervention). Sarkar is rare within the Indian episteme as political discourse has either been dominated by analysis of Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, focused on instructions to the prince on how to gain and maintain power (largely amoral), or on moral issues, how to conduct oneself in family and caste, to follow one's dharma.\footnote{The opposition to this dichotomy has been the eupsychia of the yogi. His search was for a utopia of the mind, an anti-politics of individual transcendence.\footnote{It has either been the warrior or the priest who has dominated Indian political theoretical space, with the yogi as the alternative to both. But Sarkar borrowing from many traditions makes structure paramount.}} The opposition to this dichotomy has been the eupsychia of the yogi. His search was for a utopia of the mind, an anti-politics of individual transcendence.\footnote{It has either been the warrior or the priest who has dominated Indian political theoretical space, with the yogi as the alternative to both. But Sarkar borrowing from many traditions makes structure paramount.} It has either been the warrior or the priest who has dominated Indian political theoretical space, with the yogi as the alternative to both. But Sarkar borrowing from many traditions makes structure paramount.

For Sarkar there are four types of power:\footnote{For Sarkar there are four types of power: the economic, the coercive/protective, the normative/ideological and the chaotic/disruptive. Sarkar derives these from the classical Indian social system of *varna* but reinterprets them not as biological caste categories but as psychological class, structure, episteme or paradigm. The first is exercised by business associations, the second by the military, the third by intellectuals and priests and the fourth by workers and peasants. Using Vico-type constructs – along with Vico's soft historical determinism – these four types of power are related to four ages in history: the age of the workers, the age of the warriors, the age of intellectuals and the age of capitalists. At the end of the capitalist era, there is a workers' revolution or evolution which then leads to a centralization of military power and the next age of warriors. Each age has it own contradictions and by denying the other forms of power, each era naturally leads to the next era.} the economic, the coercive/protective, the normative/ideological and the chaotic/disruptive. Sarkar derives these from the classical Indian social system of *varna* but reinterprets them not as biological caste categories but as psychological class, structure, episteme or paradigm. The first is exercised by business associations, the second by the military, the third by intellectuals and priests and the fourth by workers and peasants. Using Vico-type constructs – along with Vico's soft historical determinism – these four types of power are related to four ages in history: the age of the workers, the age of the warriors, the age of intellectuals and the age of capitalists. At the end of the capitalist era, there is a workers' revolution or evolution which then leads to a centralization of military power and the next age of warriors. Each age has it own contradictions and by denying the other forms of power, each era naturally leads to the next era.

For Sarkar, each form of power is also a way of knowing the world. While Montesquieu made the jump from types of government to types of society, thinking of societies as whole and their interconnections – instead of merely politics as in the traditional sense\footnote{Like classical thinkers and theories of governance, Sarkar proposes that each of these forms has a perverse side: *vidya* (good or introversion) and *avidya* (bad or extroversion), but not the abuser of the polity, then perhaps we need to think of alternative notions of power.} – Sarkar goes a step further and includes ways of knowing the world, or borrowing from Foucault, the episteme. However, this way of knowing or ‘collective psychology’ crystallizes in a ruling class; history is seen as the history of these forms of power and classes. As the cycle of power turns, each particular way of knowing takes its turn in becoming dominant. Previous forms of power remain but in a recessive form or in a ceremonialized form (royalty in modern democracies, for example). Sarkar's hope for the future is to develop a new force – a fifth power – that will allow, through the creation of new institutions, these four classes to rule in turn without exploiting the other classes and forms of power. This is made concrete in his new definition of leadership – the *sadvipra*: one with a complete and pure mind.

Like classical thinkers and theories of governance, Sarkar proposes that each of these forms has a perverse side: *vidya* (good or introversion) and *avidya* (bad or extroversion), but
unlike Aristotle, he does not develop political categories for them. For Aristotle, the perversion of monarchy was tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; and of polity, democracy. In contrast, for classical Chinese political philosopher Ssu-ma Chien, there were no categories for polities but for leaders. The leader was either tyrannical or wise. Indeed history was characterized by rhythmic cycles of a dynasty led by the sage-king and that then over time degenerated into leadership by the tyrant. For Ssu-ma Chien, the problem of the appropriate mix of types of power was resolved by the ideal of the intellectual king who was not merely a philosopher (this was only one necessary ingredient) but as sage, particularly as taoist sage. The Tao was not transcendent in Ssu-ma Chien's classic articulation, rather the Tao was present when there was justice and equity, when decisions were based on knowledge and learning. In tyranny it was not present. The Tao also could not be evoked nor could one die for the Tao as one could for Islam, the Church or the modern nation-state. The Tao was illusive. For Ssu-Ma Chien then it was the sage-king that brought on the new dynasty. 

Sarkar's leadership type, sadvipra, is perhaps similar to the classical Chinese formulation; however, his ideal leader must have characteristics of all the types of powers — worker (service), warrior (protection), intellectual (theory generation), and capitalist (in the form of entrepreneurial spirit). But, as with Ssu-Ma Chien's articulation, he must be essentially spiritual, that is, in touch with the deeper patterns of history, society and consciousness. Yet this spiritual, as we will argue, does not, as in the Western formulation, enter any political association — it remains a source of purpose and direction not exclusion nor does it privilege the particular community who believes in the Transcendent.

But in terms of the structure of power itself Gaetano Mosca's articulations come closest to Sarkar. However, Sarkar does not propose what Mosca argues for in his The Ruling Class, a system of balanced powers through judicial and legal institutions. For Mosca if one social force ever becomes dominant, there is tyranny. But fortunately there are checks: 

Military power is checked and balanced by money or religion; or money, perhaps, checked and balanced by taxation imposed by land; or an obstreperous religious hierarchy checked and balanced now by superstitious sects which group up within itself, now by coalitions of external forces of enlightenment.

But for Sarkar from the macro level, in the long duree, one varna is dominant and the others are subservient. However, for Sarkar — in agreement with Mosca — social forces, not categories of government are the key in understanding history.

For Sarkar, given that these forms of power evolve historically, they are for all practical purposes natural; they cannot be eliminated or collectively transcended. The task for Sarkar is to transform this historical social cycle — laborer, warrior, intellectual, capitalist, laborer — into a social spiral thus allowing power to enable progressive forms of economy, culture and polity.

Leadership and the Yogi

But instead of following the modern approach of developing an alternative governmental structure (checks and balances by branch or function) to mitigate the exploitive forms of these powers, Sarkar takes the classical approach and resorts to human agency. His task is to develop leaders that have the characteristics of all four powers (economic, martial, labor, and intellectual) but is guided by the ethical and the spiritual — sadvipras or benevolent
intellectuals. This is done through spiritual practices, through gaining experience in all four types of powers, through working with the oppressed and marginalized, and through understanding the mechanisms of historical change. Resorting to the moral discourse, Sarkar writes ‘people will recognize sadvipras by their conduct, their devotion to service, their dutifulness and their moral integrity.’ This then implies that the ‘false consciousness’ created by class or other structures of obfuscation can be broken through the virtuousness of the saint-leader. Similarities between Sarkar's sadvipras and Antonio Gramsci’s organic intellectuals should also be obvious. Gramsci thought that:22

. . . the more ‘advanced intellectuals’ would take on a large number of indispensable ideological-cultural projects: subverting the illusions of conventional ideologies, introducing and disseminating critical views of social reality, presenting an alternative vision of the future.

But to this notion of the organic intellectual, Sarkar adds a spiritual dimension as defined by a commitment to universalism (beyond ego, family, nation, and race), neo-humanism (respect and rights for plants, animals and humans), and an epistemological position in which the universe is believed to have many layers, the crudest of which is the material, the most profound of which is pure unexpressed Consciousness. The real is not divided into false and truth but as with Spengler into shallow and deep.

Remembering both Gandhi and Aurobindo, leadership becomes defined not in the traditional Greek sense but in the traditional Indian sense: that of the yogi. Through spiritual practices the yogi remains outside the vortex of material power. He or she can fast, can live in poverty and has conquered fear. Neither king nor merchant (or venture capitalist) can seduce him or her. While in the West self-reflection produces the enlightened philosopher king, for the yogi the self is beyond mere intellectual reflection, it is knowable through direct intuitive experience, through samadhi. But Sarkar adds social responsibility to the task of the yogi and thus moves near the positions of Sri Aurobindo and Mohandas Gandhi. For Aurobindo, reinterpreting Hegel, the spirit expressed itself not only in individuals but associations as well, particularly the decolonizing nations. Individuals could express this spirit in the nation-building process. For Gandhi, too, it was the spirit as expressed in a new type of leadership that was central to recreating the future. For Gandhi as well the yogi need not be a renunciate, he could be a family man. Both added an activist dimension to the classical role of the yogi. However, for Sarkar the spiritual remains outside of associations, it remains metaphorical, inspiring individuals but not nesting in social structures such as family, tribe or nation nor even in nature as with the Chinese Tao.

For Sarkar the yogi must struggle to create a society where basic needs and distributive justice are met so that all have the possibility of self-enlightenment. Individual enlightenment exists in the context of societal development. The yogi appears then as the ‘postmodern structural revolutionary,’ rethinking reality, monitoring the cycles of power, and serving the oppressed. Postmodern because the real is deconstructed, made particular, structural because there is a commitment to the grand historical narratives of history, and revolutionary because one must transform the structure of reality, the lives of the oppressed. The yogi, for Sarkar, is neither institutionalized priest nor fringe shaman.23

Sarkar not only focuses on the moral dimension, he also articulates the mechanisms of his alternative leadership in the context of the structure of governance, thus differing from classical theorists. Thus, when a form of power (economic power, for example) as exhibited in a particular governmental structure (capitalism and representative democracy) becomes overly
centralized, *sadvipras* would create or engage in activity that would lead to a revolution (or evolution as appropriate), a decentralization of power and a coming in of the next stage of the cycle.

Is this spiritual and social engineering? Perhaps. But in this engineering, a space for an alternative theory of politics and leadership is made possible, unbounded by national politics and inclusive of evolutionary structures of power. Sensitive to the history of social engineering (that is, in the accumulation of power in the guise of representation or in the name of enlightenment) Sarkar does not centralize the power and political locations of *sadvipras*. Their locus of power is people. Their power is populist, based on the person not on the institution. Thus representation moves away from *acting for* particular individuals as defined by national sovereignty and moves to acting for the interests of a general and universal 'humanity.' But while Sarkar rejects nation-states and opts for a world federation of self-reliant economic units, it is at the local level that power is expressed and exercised.

Sarkar thus desires to strengthen neither business nor government but community populist associations. Government and business will always over time be served by those who have their own self-interest first and the interest of the collective second. He desires to further strengthen private civil society at the expense of governmental power. It is the deepening of democracy at the level of daily life.

**Democracy and participation**

In the introduction to a special issue of the journal, *Alternatives* on Democracy, Yoshikazu Sakamoto argues that the democratization of civil society is one of four dimensions of the deepening of democracy:24

Democracy in everyday life in civil society implies a constant questioning of and resistance to the formation of [unequal] power relations. Herein lies the crucial role to be played by the citizens' social movement. It is the agent which democratizes not only the state and civil society, respectively; it is also the agent which democratizes the linkage between the two.

This democratization has two levels: the micro level exhibited by the many social service agencies and the macro level by the antisystemic social movements who are fighting for liberty, fraternity and equality25 and who can provide a check to self-interested political power. But for Sarkar, mere democratization of formal political institutions (a multiparty system, holding of elections, for example) does not necessarily lead to a better society:26

One cannot expect this moral force from a government power functioning within a democratic structure. We must expect it from the non-political side. The government, be it fascist, imperialist, republican, dictatorial, bureaucratic or democratic, is sure to become tyrannical if there is no moral force to check the capricious activities of the leaders of the party in power.

Participation in economic and cultural developments becomes more important than electing governmental leaders, whom are often elected through vote buying and other sorts of election rigging in which individuals are pressured through coercive forces (the landlords and their administrative and police links). It is in this economic arena where Sarkar calls for universal voting (economic democracy) in the form of worker managed and run cooperatives. Income distribution and the full participation of the marginalized is far more important than electoral
politics. Indeed, for Sarkar democracy can only be successful in the context of a spiritual socialism. Moreover, participation must be globalized; the framework for democracy should be the planetary community not the nation-state.

In contrast are enlightenment democratic efforts where the notion of leader as having access to special knowledge or access to deeper layers of consciousness is forsaken for the safety of pervasive democracy, for a state organized by checks and balances, of the separation of powers, for humans while occasional good are essentially sinful, evil. But in Sarkar's cosmology humans are pulled in two directions by *vidya* and *avidya*. Through spiritual practices the latter can be controlled. Moreover, evil is merely false or low consciousness not a living force as in the Western tradition. The leader then occupies a particularly privileged space in Indian cosmology (as well as East Asian). Central are vertical relations with respect for authority in its various forms: *guru* and prince (but not merchant). Sarkar's theoretical move is to assert that while checks and balance are necessary it is leadership that represents not a particular class but the interests of the collective that is critical for a future political design.

But for Yoshikazu Sakamoto democracy must be continuously deepened, specifically in four areas: in formal political institutions, in economic institutions, in civil society and global politics. However, for Sarkar the last three are far more important than the first. However, most debate centers on the first. Indeed, to not focus on the first leads to political marginalization. One is suddenly removed from the Western heritage, the linear march of democracy from Greece to the United States. But this is not Sarkar's heritage. Speaking from a third world perspective for which he attempts to reappropriate democracy and its tradition (thus his assertion that democracy first began in India with the Licchivis), other issues are far more important than the narrowly defined political qua government and elections.

However, Sarkar does not focus on the classic question of who will watch over the keepers of the good in terms palatable to liberal democrats. For them, this has been the strength of the democracy system, that it is a lesser evil. However, for Sarkar, while this may be true, more often than not liberal democracies merely reinforce the capitalist class and structure, exporting their problems to the colonies. We can however ask of Sarkar's theory: what is there to prevent this new revolutionary class from being influenced by *avidya* and joining the particular power structure of the time thus making the transition to the new structure, the new era, even more difficult? Is this not too much of a burden for the *sadvipra*? While Sarkar criticizes the checks and balances of democracy (indeed, calling democracy group-governed polity) as well as other forms of governance (dictatorship and oligarchy), potential problems with Sarkar's alternative model of politics have not been examined by PROUT commentators. Sarkar leaves his theory of leadership as the solution to the problem of politics. Of course, insofar as this type of leadership is based not on official governmental (state power) or corporate power (exchange power) but on community and personal power, the possibilities of abuse are less. As they are not part of the official discourse (since their power is located in civil society), their legitimacy is stronger and, paradoxically for the very same reason, more liminal. Still, Sarkar is sensitive to these types of criticisms. Sarkar writes that his preferred polity is never one person rule but a council, a board of *sadvipras*, thus allowing *sadvipras* to monitor each other's behavior. The spiritualization of society, the democratization of the economy, interwoven citizen boards, and councils of *sadvipras* becomes Sarkar's answer to the question of abuse of power by those intending to do good.
Leadership, structure and the transcendental

From the classical and modern Islamic view, Sarkar's position is not dramatically novel; indeed, it contains some of the same problems that Muslims faced after the death of Muhammad and the conclusion of the reign of the rightly guided Caliphs (those who accurately represented the words and the practices of Muhammad).

Islam anticipates a new moral order with acceptance of the Transcendental and His laws as the central strategy to creating a good society. Governmental structure in specific is less important than creating a virtuous society. They key is moral behavior following the laws as set by the Prophet. Ibn Khaldun, however, is far more critical. Writing at the time of the decline of the Islam empire, he saw that it was not morality that united a government but struggle leading to *asabiya* (group feeling or the sinews that bind). However, over time (specifically four generations), a dynasty declines. It success results in increased power and control but eventually leisure, waste, squandering, imposition of a dynasty's group feeling onto others leads to a civilization decline. History then degenerates until a new leader from outside of the Center comes in and takes power. Like Su-Ma Chien and Sarkar, Ibn Khaldun has a cyclical theory of power. However, for Khaldun moral virtue is important only insofar it increases group unity. Religion in its own sake is not a necessary factor for good government or society, all polities will rise and fall.

Classical Islamic theory, however, has resisted efforts such as Ibn Khaldun to modernize the problems of the spiritual in society. Classical Islamic theory in fact is a search for the ‘*khalifa*,’ the ‘righteous’ representation of God while the Shia approach on the theory of the khalifa is the search for the perfect representative of God, the *Mahdi*. However, in the Indian and Chinese sense, a perfect leader is not possible as the universe is fraught with contradictions with opposites that are socially not reconcilable. In contrast, Montesquieu, far more concerned with the tyranny of power then with the search for the perfect monarch or executive, focused on ways to reduce the power of one individual.

Agreeing with Montesquieu, the problem is that it is impossible to create a legion of saints, argue critics of classical Islamic political theory. Western political theorists such as Hobbes assumed that since we are all sinners, safeguards to the accumulation of power need to be built in to governance structures. But Islamic civilization did have a perfect leader (a perfect representation of the laws of God) and a perfect constitution (The Medina constitution) and State. Christianity had a savior but not a perfect polity, there was no constitution (between believers) or perfect polity (rights and duties, relations with other communities) while Jesus was alive. Thus it was not to the polity of the past that Christians looked toward but rather the return of the Savior since the Church even as it claimed perfect representation and guidance could still be made problematic since Jesus was not alive and never created a State. However, in the Islamic case all future Islamic states are judged on that perfection and the order that came with the original State.

With the decline and breakdown of Islam, the structure of one-person rule was kept but without that one-person living as a saint, in fact the opposite occurred since association was now no longer voluntary but based on coercion, on trying to restrain dynastic, ethnic and personal histories. Faced with the breakdown of unity in the Islamic empire, Muslims opted for authoritarian often brutal leaders. The choice was chaos or authoritarian leadership with only the Medina State to look backward in hope for. The mistake was that no social structures, no institutions were created to tame power lest the saint quickly become sinner. Islam failed to
create intermediary structures to limit the power of the ruler and stayed with the model of one leader (whomever he was), one text, and one nation (the ummah). Missing was a structural theory of power, either one was saint or sinner. Thus it is this quest for idealism then that has been the betrayal of Islam. According to El-Affendi:

Had the theory concentrated on the practical functions of government in a given State, then it would have been much easier to formulate a constitution to which the ruler would be required to adhere. However, by setting unattainable standards, it was easy to pass from the conclusion that perfection was impossible to the claim that all imperfect situations were equal. The present imperfect situation was therefore the best possible solution. Classical theory then gave advice on how to tolerate tyranny. Classical theory did not offer any recommendation on how to deal with such tyrants and dislodge them, which was the kind of guidance the pious needed, not advice about the limit to which they should tolerate tyranny.

In this sense Sarkar’s sadvipras may follow the same route. Fortunately, Sarkar, as touched on earlier, conscious of the problem of the politics of the transcendent, argues for a council of sadvipras – not merely one leader – and of a shadow government, a series of semi-autonomous boards, for example, and Sarkar retains Montesquieu’s tri-system of government. In the name of spiritual perfection, he does not reject the doctrine of the separation of powers, the taming power of democracy, as classical Islamic theory did.

The original State then in Islam became the representation of heaven with the original leader the representative of God. According to El-Affendi, the insistence on perfection: . . . in the khalifa automatically removed from the community the right to criticize him, for everyone is by definition less pious, less learned and less wise than he is. In the end, the fate of the ummah hung on the arrival of an individual who would unite in his personal charisma, saintliness and power. The waiting for this impossible arrival was bound to relegate Muslim thinking to the realm of mythology and passive ineptitude.

But for Sarkar, perfection is not possible in this world, the goal is a good society, to reduce the tendency towards avidya, towards exploitation. Unlike Western cosmology (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) in Indian thought perfection is only possible at the level of individual enlightenment. A prefect polity is impossible. Sarkar’s immediate concern is to rethink the passive role of the Yogi (and ‘hindu’ thought in general) then with attempting to counterbalance the Islamic recovery of the perfect social and political representation of God. Sarkar’s sadvipra then does not passively reflect on the mysteries of the universe and the laws of social change, he or she is ready to use organized force – intellectual, economic, military and mass – to create revolution or evolution. Moral and spiritual leadership now find a new focus transcending single focus albeit progressive revolutions such as apartheid, colonialism or economic exploitation (and thus in some ways continuing the project of the Enlightenment). The sadvipra is focused on foresight (understanding the mechanisms of social changes) and compassionate service (the transcendence of individual ego for the social good), not an approximation of an ideal polity or the wait for the ideal savior to arrest the decline or degeneration of civilization.

In contrast, for Ssu-ma Chien society could be perfect mirroring the perfection of the heavens. And just as the leader was expected to represent the heavens, the follower was expected to show perfect fidelity to the monarch. When each and every person followed the natural moral order, then virtue would flourish and the Tao would reign. But subjects and leader did not always follow this order, and with each and every infidelity and tyranny, the
natural state of perfection would degenerate, would transform. One could not expect stasis, for ultimately the Tao was not a static principle, like nature it was constituted by the contradictory principles of stability and transformation.

In contrast, Buddhist theories of governance are focused both on virtue and democracy. Sulak Sivaraksa gives us a Buddhist reading of the problem of governance. Besides traditional precepts on how the king should rule, Buddhism has two dominating mythological stories. In the first, over time the perfect existence of ethereal beings in a golden age gradually descends to greed, hatred and delusion. ‘Finally, the world is consumed with chaos, and, in order to put an end to it, the beings gather to choose a king from among their ranks to rule over them and maintain order.’ The beings recognize that they need a superordinate authority since the result of each individual self-interest is the not the maximization of all their interests as with Adam Smith but the destruction of individual and group interests. The superordinate authority is needed because of individual ego. He is called the Great Elect, the monarchy is a preventive institution, and there is a social contract between ruler and the ruled. In return for order, the subjects support the king. Individuals are willing to lose some of their own wealth for the good of the group but the monarch is not perfect in the sense of a perfect leader or a representative of the heavens, rather he is elected.

In the second myth, the legend of the Universal Monarch, the Golden Age has a perfect king called Dalhanemi. He is instrumental in maintaining it. ‘Because he knows what is good and rules through Dharma, poverty, ill will, violence and wrong doing do not exist.’

The public can know who is the Universal Monarch because a magnificent wheel remains suspended in mid air over the royal palaces, emblematic of his sovereignty. But as with cyclical models of the universe, this Dharmic state declines and the wheel of Dharma begins to sink. The wise monarch then entrusts his throne to his son, and leaves the official world for the life of an ascetic in the forest.

But unlike the medieval model of the monarchy, where divine rule could be passed on to the son, here the son must prove his own righteousness. Son after son does this, but eventually, there is a ruler for whom the wheel does not appear, and the decline hastens:

- From not giving to the destitute, poverty grew rife; form poverty growing rife, stealing increased; form the spread of stealing, violence grew apace; form the growth of violence, the destruction of life became quite common; from the frequency of murder, the life span and the beauty of the beings wasted away.

The polity declines further until a virtual state of anarchy and chaos reigned. Again there is no virtuous leader, no perfect State. Unlike the first myth where individuals elect a sovereign in this myth, as in the Islamic model, there is a wait for the universal monarch, the Amida Buddha, who will deliver the faithful to the good society. But for Sulak, more important than the wait for the Universal monarch is the creation of a good buddhist society based on the social implications of the eight fold path, that is, self-sufficiency, ecology, self-reliance, global governance, and individual morality. However, it is the latter model of the universal monarch that regimes use to justify authoritarian rule or rule without popular mandate. But unlike Islam, the criteria of governance is not a historical ideal of perfection (the Buddha had no polity but a sangha, a spiritual community) but social morality and order.

For German philosopher Eric Voegelin, the problem of classical Islamic theory is also a problem for the Christian West. Perfection ceased to be a spiritual pursuit once the transcendent entered history (once it was possible to represent God in social structure).
modern world became the end of history, the perfection of history thus allowing for the possibility of positivism, Nazism, socialism and developmentalism to commit all sorts of horrors in the name of the linear march of Truth. Beginning with 12th century monk Joachin de Flora, the Christian trinity became concrete in the division of history into ancient, medieval and modern or later in Comte's theological, philosophical and positive rendering of history. Thus with the immanetization of history, truth no longer is uncertain or changing, rather it is fixed. Certainly not taoist or yogic.

The important lesson classical Islamic political theory does teach is that without democratic structures, individual rights, a theory of the transcendental will lead to despotism since the leader can claim to represent the virtues of the Transcendental. Power politics then will overcome any vision of the ideal, thus political theory must have both, a vision of the ideal and a sense of how humans are betrayed by these ideals. But for the believer, without a society focused on the religious, he forsakes his or her duty to create heaven on earth.

Sarkar, sensitive to the history of moral arguments of vipras (intellectuals) to exploit other classes, to place themselves in a privileged space, argues for a spiritual society not a theocratic polity. The spiritual with its claim to be outside of nation or class or ethnicity changes the ground of one's decisionmaking. Its evidence is in social tolerance, basic human rights, participation in economic decisionmaking. Behavior is not restricted (expect for example through ceilings of wealth and ownership because of limited resources) but is culturally and intellectually expressive. The ideational then must be balanced with the sensate, to borrow Sorokin's typology.

Using types of power to develop governmental design

By using Montesquieu and Sarkar, the intent of this essay is thus to argue that a third factor is also needed, this is a theory of the structure of power. Sarkar begins this task by placing his model of governance in the larger context of his typology of history and power. During times of economic power, there should be limited democracy, during times of martial rule, there should be a council of leaders. In terms of historical forms, Sarkar finds that when there is worker rule (prehistory and revolutionary times) the political system is anarchy; during warrior rule (empires and kingdoms as well as modern military states) there are monarchies or dictatorships; during intellectual rule (the great religions and the bureaucracy) there are republics; and during capitalist rule, there is mass democracy. Marx was nowhere near as sophisticated merely arguing that governance will first be dictatorial (the rule of the proletariat) and then the State in itself will be redundant.

While Sarkar is useful to us on his unique cultural terms in that we gain insight into an alternative non-Western perspective of history and democracy, our effort here is not only comparison. Our effort is to borrow from Sarkar and ask the following: Why not attempt political design that includes these four types of power and ways of knowing the world: why not go beyond classifications of the one, the few, and the many. If these four types of power represent universal interests, why not find ways in which they can be exercised for and against each other? Why not develop appropriate designs that have embedded in them this classic four-fold structure of power? Perhaps there should be along with legislative, executive, and judicial, a fourth house? Or more simply perhaps the legislative (the historical house of nobles) should be broken down into four houses instead of the present one house or two house parliamentary or presidential system.
The first house could be inclusive of capitalists and cooperatives and other economic forms. The second inclusive of the military and the police. The third of intellectuals in the form of technocrats, academics and priests (government, university and church/temple). The fourth inclusive of workers and peasants. In this design the political becomes formally shared by the four. Thus, instead of dividing the polity into rule of the one, the few and the many, we inject these types of power into the third, the many as represented through the legislative. This way not only are the classic divisions of power combined but in addition Sarkar’s types of power which tell us about the type of power (normative, coercive, remunerative or mass) find entrance into the polity. At present, the intellectuals reside in the universities and the temples (and in various anti-systemic social movements); they are rarely represented in government except as consultants through think tanks. Workers are represented through trade unions such as they are. The capitalists and the military have a great deal of representation either directly through members of parliament or through Congressmen and women (in the presidential system). In third world countries, politicians come from this class (landlords/military) and in first world countries they emerge from the rich. Each type of power attempts to control and manage the executive, judicial and legislative.

Certainly one could expand this model and articulate a House of the Environment or a House of Women. In other words, the environment (history in one sense is but the story of how humans have attempted to export their pollution up to the present, where there is increasingly no longer as social or physical space to export our problems – we must deal with them) becomes represented by various interest groups. Gender as well could be represented structurally not merely in terms of increased leadership in the Executive. Certainly the relationships between the various houses would have to negotiated.

In the modern world the strategy to gain control of the ideas and forces that govern constructions of the real have largely been accomplished through the crystallization of power into groups of representation, that is, through the political party. And, if we look at the range of political parties we see that they somehow attempt to represent these different types of powers (conservatives as economic and military power, green as people and earth power, communist as martial and people power, fundamentalist groups as normative power); however parties mask their interest and have managed to consolidate power such that alternative forms of power have no way of emerging (The American system is the classic model of this problem wherein the two party structure forces each party to move to the center to maximize the chances of winning).

Could a four house system representing these types of powers work better? Or are there better ways to represent these power structures in the political, in governance; perhaps one type of power should only be vested in the executive, another in the legislative and another in the judicial? The capitalists during their era could be the executives, the intellectuals the lawmakers and the workers the judges and the military/police could supervise the whole effort. In different historical periods, this division of the four powers in the three branches of government could change with workers as lawmakers, intellectuals as executives; thus, historical rotation by structure of power.

While the design above is preliminary, the task in front of us – more than the actual design itself – is the need to develop alternative designs of governance that reflect these types of power and go beyond classical typologies and solely Western or modern designs.

One such recent effort is that of Johan Galtung’s. He theorizes about global governance.
using Sarkar’s division of power to ask what type of power should global government exercise: ‘cultural/normative (moral authority), economic/exchange (rewarding those who conform, sanctioning those who do not), military/coercive (punishing those who do not conform, not those who do), political/decision power (in only the form of resolutions?).’ Arguing for a world system that brings in these types of powers and associated components (Civil society representing all sorts of voluntary associations; people representing individuals; Capital representing economic organizations; and the State representing military and political power), Galtung writes that ‘there is no simple solution for four kinds of power and four components ... let them play against each other, have a maximum of dialogue, and then some central mechanisms for arriving at final decisions.’ He calls for an expanded UN that has alongside a UN General Assembly (representing States), a world version of Capital in the form of a House of Transnationals (with a world assembly of Chambers of Commerce as a consulting body); a world assembly of people (directly elected); and a world assembly of Civil society in the form of non-governmental organizations and other international associations (including labor and religion, one can assume). There would be a complex interplay between these houses and forms of power, thus better representing the different ways humans organize themselves and allowing for a softer world government, a global governance. Of course, if we should avoid this structural analysis (class and power) and stay at the level of the individual and assert that no one can represent another (mirror their ideas or act for them) then direct electronic democracy or the direct village democracy appears to be the best answer to the present political system. Certainly political parties and government based only on legislative, executive and judicial structures seem far from satisfactory in solving the pressing social problems that first and third world societies are beset with. Perhaps, as with Galtung, we can attempt to borrow from various perspectives, developing systems that include electronic democracy, moral leadership, and structures of power.

Cross-dialogue

While the above governmental designs may be novel, they are not Sarkar’s. Sarkar’s, himself, does not relate varna to governmental structure as the previous design attempts to (types of power to branches of government). His goal is to create a fifth form of power that ‘shadows’ these other four. Whether this type of political and spiritual leadership and power is possible – disinterested in a particular class but not in social transformation for the good of all classes – is another question! Certainly from the perspective of proponents of liberal democracy, Sarkar, Gandhi, Aurobindo as well as the Muslim position unnecessarily bring back the spiritual, a category the European enlightenment did its best to remove. But in India there was no enlightenment signifying the end of the Medieval, rather there has been a continuous focus on the transformation of the self, on its enlightenment. It is only recently with Aurobindo, Gandhi and Sarkar that the social implications of self-enlightenment have become central. Politics has moved quickly from the village to the nation to a universal humanity. The danger of this move has been the transition of a personalized religion to a syndicated State oriented modernist Hinduism. In contrast, the Sarkarian formulation is part of the classical Indian polity where the government is neither secular nor religious, rather the State must be fair to all perspectives, religious and secular. The task of the State, as with the structure of personalized Hinduism, is to encourage pluralism of not only ideological positions but ways of knowing.

From the postmodern perspective, the entire project would be denied from the outset as there is no vantage point from which consciousness is transparent. Moreover, the real is
mediated through language, through culture and thus politics. There is no point from which the truth of history can be made especially accessible, indeed, the search for totalizing universals is part of the problem, part of logocentric history, of a history based on the modern abstraction of ‘man’. Contending that history can be suddenly rendered plainly intelligible, grand historical narratives merely privilege a particular class, party, group at the expense of local forms of knowledge and power.

From the traditional liberal view, Marxism and Sarkar's PROUT are too similar. Sarkar's sadvipras and the entire scheme of structure of power reduce the power of the individual and mobility of capital. State power in a variety of forms is strengthened.

From the related view of the electronic democrats, Sarkar's moves and the structural design presented earlier are entirely unnecessary for dramatic developments in technology will make representation unnecessary since face to face community and thus democracy at all levels will soon be possible. Power will have no place to hide as we will all continuously face it. Spiritual leadership and structures of power will become but a discourse of the past, problems that have been rendered technologically obsolete. But for Sarkar, even as technology resolves some dilemmas it creates new problems, new relations of structure and power, for technology is embedded in the social.

The Green perspective echoing Gandhi would focus not on structure but the process of transformation, arguing that as important as social and spiritual goals is participation. Since representation is problematic then participation should be central. And where we need legislators they should not be allowed to become a class, thus the importance of reforms such as term limits, rotation of leadership, and low economic benefits. However, at the same time Greens would be probably quite amenable to structural changes that included the environment in public and private decision making.

**Conclusion**

Starting with Montesquieu and focusing on Sarkar, the intent of this essay has been to take seriously historical structures of power and to move these structures from the background of discussions on political design to the foreground. Theories of politics that focus merely on virtue and morality often paradoxically create conditions for tyranny, as El-Affendi has argued was the case in the growth of Islamic Khalifa. In this sense, the Medina constitution and the acceptance of Muhammad as the final arbiter, while being the source of strength for Muslims for centuries, has also lead to conditions where governmental structure has been made invisible. Whether the new electronic technologies will aid in creating a politics of consensus as Muhammad intended remains to be seen. Indeed, from the postmodernist position, these new technologies will have the opposite impact, however. They will break down any notion of community, of a shared understanding of the good society, of virtue and vice. In contrast, in the classical Chinese system, virtue is needed but not as an ideal based on allegiance to an other worldly transcendent. The Tao is here and there, then and now, ever illusive. For Sarkar what is needed is a new type of leadership conscious of the patterns of history and the structures of power that gives us our selves. The transcendent is there to inspire, not build edifices to and for. Without this transcendent motivation, ‘achievements actuated with limited motives, destitute of cosmic feelings, cannot last. The cruel touch of time will annihilate them [social structures]."
Notes

1. Sarkar is important to us in that perhaps more than any other Indian thinker in this century, he has contributed to developing an alternative non-Western theory of politics, economics, culture, and consciousness. Various nations and regions have begun experimenting with Proutist economic and social philosophies. Thus, the researcher has a chance to examine the dynamics between theory and practice. Gandhi comes close but was not as comprehensive or global. Worn down by the politics of partition, Gandhi could not develop the links between local and global structures.

2. Peter Manicas, 'Montesquieu and the Eighteenth Century Vision of the State,' History of Political Thought (Summer 1981), 324.


5. In this sense, schizophrenia is perhaps the best model to describe the postmodern future. We live in each other hallucinations with no concrete self to serve as a measure for what is real.

6. For one effort, see Howard Rheingold 'Electronic Democracy.' Whole Earth Review (Summer 1991). Rheingold seeks to help citizens gain access to information technologies so as to regain communicative power previously limited to large institutions. And in classic Americanese, Rheingold quotes Dave Hughes: 'Electronic citizenship means freedom of electronic expression. I think Benjamin Franklin would have been the first owner of a microcomputer. I think that the Declaration of Independence would have been written on a word processor. And I think that Tom Paine would have made Common Sense available on an electronic bulletin board.'


10. See Lee Kuan Yew, 'The Vision for Asia,' The Friday Muslim (March 20, 1992). As Lee Kuan Yew writes, 'I suggest that the problem is deeper than just administrative skills (underdevelopment of south asia).’ One man, one vote presupposes a society in which adjustments and accommodations can be made within the system by throwing up representatives who then canvas or push for their section or their sectoral interests. ...election after election if you throw up nothing but more strife, its ends up in destruction. ...No amount of one man, one vote will resolve the Punjab problem or the Assam problem or the Kashmir problem, because it presupposes a certain community of interests, a certain shared destiny. But when people challenge whether they are part of the system, how can the system work? I think it is a fatal flaw to group heterogeneous interests in one polity which
rules without any compromise or accommodation.,’ 1.

11. South Korean political scientist, Sang-Min Lee makes a similar point. For practicing democracy, above all politicians and people should become democratic persons. Because the self belongs to the social individual, personality is connected to sociality. ...The object of democracy shall be self perfection based on the awakening of the self. [The] awakening self means that the individual accepts the subject of self-regulating opinion. Self-perfection is the same as the subject of conscious behavior, namely, a man of virtue, ‘4-5. Paper Presented at the X11 World Conference of the World Futures Studies Federation, Barcelona, Spain, September 17-21, 1991.


16. Galtung, too, has formulated a structural theory of power. He, however, adds a fifth dimension: the totally marginalized who never gain power. See his ‘The Green Movement: A Socio-Historical Exploration.’ International Sociology (Vol. 1, No. 1, 1986). Kenneth Boulding has developed a similar typology in his Three Faces of Power, London, Sage, 1988. For Boulding there are three types of power: destructive (threat), Productive (exchange) and integrative (love or respect). These are related to political-military, economic and social forces. He, however, does not place these categories in a theory of history.


20. Without a theory of progress, humanity is forever caught in a repetitive cycle. However without the cycle and only a theory of progress, all sorts of intervention to those who are considered backward is possible.


23. Ashis Nandy in his brilliant essay ‘Shamans, Savages, and the Wilderness: On the Audibility of Dissent and the Future of Civilization.’ Alternatives (Vol. 14, No. 3, 1989), points us in the direction of the shaman. The shaman exists on the fringe and the margins of respectable society and respectable models of knowledge and development. The shaman is subversive but not as an expert, not one who can be coopted by institutionalized power. For Sarkar, tantra is based on the shamanic tradition, however, Sarkar seeks to develop a new form of leadership that moves beyond both shaman and priest: there is dissent but there is also struggle within the boundaries of established society even as the sadvipra attempts to create new boundaries. We will have to wait to see if this dialectical progression is possible.
Situating Sarkar

27. See R.B.J. Walker, ‘On the Spatiotemporal Conditions of Democratic Practice,’ Alternatives (No. 16, 1991). Walker examines how democracy as expressed in state sovereignty ‘constrains our capacity to imagine the potentials of local, grassroots, and marginal practices.’ (245)
28. Acarya Prasiidananda Avadhuta argues that Sarkar does answer the classic question of who will watch over the keepers of the good. The social boards will monitor each other and any member who violates strict ethical codes will be asked to step down. That is, there will be a dynamic tension between the various sadvipras. Personal Communications, August 20, 1991.
29. Interestingly those rulers who after Muhammad attempted to be idealistic had more rebellions in their camps (since there were continuous discussions on the virtue of the leader, how did he stack up against the image of the saint) as in the case of Ali, while leaders who made power expansion their goal were not judged in that way. They were ‘secular’ rulers like Muawiya who were not judged the same way Ali and others were. Again this aided in the decline of the Islamic Khalifa.
32. Present debates within Islamic political theory focus on how to reconstruct Islam for the next century. El-Affendi, for instance, offers these suggestions: (1) the Muslim polity as a decentralized democratic pluralistic association based on voluntary association, (2) the constitution as a treaty (a principle of freedom not constriction) between individuals and society, (3) the active role of the individual within the ummah.
34. ibid., 14.
35. ibid.
36. ibid., 105.
37. ibid., 106.
40. ibid., 10.
41. Charles Paprocki argues that linking Sarkar's types of power to branches of government would 'concretize varna. . . and thus reinvent the Indian caste system.' Moreover, 'the branches of government are not the only forms of political power. There is also the military and the audit branch. Different varnas will tend to concentrate in conducive political environments. In different ages, different environments will gain more authority.' And: varna should be fluid. Varna is meant to rethink history, to show how classes and individuals have been oppressed, not to be placed in concrete political